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NINETEEN 
Sartre's legacy 
Steven Churchill and Jack Reynolds 
Shaping and contesting Sartre's legacy 
The shaping of Sartre's legacy began while he was still alive. In part, this 
was due to a concerted effort from Sartre himself, and from Simone de 
Beauvoir along with others in his inner circle, to pre-empt posthumous 
evaluations, both positive and negative. In an extended interview with 
Pierre Vicary and de Beauvoir that was broadcast in early 1975 on ABC 
radio in Australia, Sartre was asked by Vicary: "How do you want to 
be remembered? What would you like your epitaph to be? How do 
you want people to remember the name Jean-Paul Sartre?". Sartre 
responded in the following terms: 
I would like them to remember [my novel] Nausea, [my plays] No 
Exit and The Devil and the Good Lord, and then my two philo-
sophical works, more particularly the second one, Critique of 
Dialectical Reason. Then my essay on Genet, Saint Genet, which I 
wrote quite a long time ago. If these are remembered, that would 
be quite an achievement, and I don't ask for1more. As a man, if 
a certain Jean-Paul Sartre is remembered, I would like people to 
remember the milieu or historical situation in which I lived, how 
I lived in it, in terms of all the aspirations which I tried to gather 
up within myself. This is how I would like to be remembered. 
(Charlesworth 1975: 154) 
One may take issue with Sartre's selection of the literary and philo-
sophical works that he chose in this case to define his legacy; while few 
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Sartre scholars would dispute the quality of the works cited here by 
Sartre, some might wonder why he chose these works as definitive of 
his career and not others. 
Yet it is the second part of Sartre's answer that is far more telling. 
Sartre explicitly asked that if he was to be remembered, he should first 
be situated within a particular historical, social and political context, 
and be understood as having pursued the possibilities open to him, 
through concrete action in situ. This suggests that Sartre regarded his 
philosophical legacy as consisting primarily in a philosophy of existence 
driven by his conceptions of human freedom and of self-creation, and 
grounded in a concrete situation, to be understood and interpreted at 
the level of lived experience. Arguably, these themes persisted in one 
form or another throughout Sartre's philosophical trajectory, although, 
of course, one may nevertheless distinguish between these ideas as they 
appear in Sartre's earlier existentialist works, and his later politically 
driven (and sometimes explicitly Marxist) works. 
Given that Sartre gave this interview late in life, we may further infer 
from his request to be situated in a particular historico-political context, 
that Sartre hoped his legacy would be understood in explicitly dialecti-
cal terms; after all, it was just such a dialectical methodology (combined 
with insights from psychoanalysis and sociology) that came to define 
his later thought. Just as Sartre had sought to enmesh his biographi-
cal portraits of great French writers (for example, Gustave Flaubert, 
Charles Baudelaire and Jean Genet) in the broad sweep of history, so 
too may Sartre be understood here as requesting that the study of his 
legacy be historically enmeshed in this way. 
As for the specific aspirations Sartre tried to ''gather up within him-
self", to use his phrase, we may infer that Sartre hoped his legacy would 
be defined in terms of his aspirations for a world free of hierarchies 
and class distinctions, his aspirations for a world unencumbered by 
self-deception or "bad faith", and so on. 
Of course, Sartre understood that in order to concretely situate his 
philosophical, political and literary legacy, he would have to project a 
certain personal image for posterity, as well. Sartre wanted those who 
encountered him to take away the message that he was serene, but nev-
ertheJess active, in the face of declining health and the looming spectre 
of death; he was almost totally blind by the time he turned seventy in 
1975, after suffering haemorrhages behind his left eye, having been 
blind in his right eye since three years of age. This meant Sartre could 
rio longer read or write as he had previously, such that he was effectively 
forced to rest from these activities, a state of mind that went entirely 
against his ferocious work ethic; he also had considerable difficulty 
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walking, even over short distances, and suffered from high blood pres-
sure and heart problems, as well as from the debilitating effects of sev-
eral strokes. These health woes in later years were primarily caused by 
Sartre's decades of heavy smoking and drinking, a diet high in saturated 
fat, and his extreme overuse of Corydrane tablets; these tablets were 
a once legally available mixture of aspirin and amphetamine (banned 
as toxic in 1971.), which Sartre used both to ward off drowsiness, and 
to increase the speed of his writing rhythm. The impression that Sartre 
wanted to give, though, was that the loss of his occupation as a writer, 
and of his health more generally, did not trouble him too much. In an 
interview to mark his seventieth birthday in 1975, Sartre had this to 
say: "I should feel very defeated, but for some unknown reason I feel 
quite good: I am never sad, nor do I have any moments of melancholy 
in thinking of what I have lost" (Sartre 1977a). 
Certainly, this image of contentedness that was presented to the pub-
lic by Sartre and his inner circle had some truth to it; Sartre continued to 
work industriously on various projects right up until his final hospitali-
zation in March of 1980, particularly on a planned book entitled Power 
and Freedom, which he had been formulating for some years. Sartre 
hoped this book would arise out of taped dialogues between himself and 
his young secretary, a former Maoist militant turned Talmud scholar by 
the name of Benny Levy (also known as Pierre Victor), since he could no 
longer write such a book on his own. Sartre had far-reaching ambitions 
for this ultimately never-completed work, describing it as the potential 
summa of all of his prior attempts at an ethics, and at a theory of politi-
cal engagement. Sartre also continued to participate directly in political 
affairs until the end of his life, appearing at various rallies with other 
prominent French intellectuals, including Michel Foucault; Sartre also 
readily gave his support (both moral and financial) to various groups 
and causes, with one of his final political interventions being to support 
a boycott of the Moscow Olympic Games, set to take place over July 
and August of 1980. Aside from his philosophical and political work, 
Sartre continued to enjoy the company of others and he took holidays 
to picturesque locations. All of this suggests tha~for a good deal of this 
time, at least, life remained tolerable, and even pleasant, for Sartre. 
In short, one is left with the impression of a man seeking to make the 
best of a deteriorating situation, seeking to maximize his possibilities 
as they began to diminish in ways that were simply beyond his control; 
arguably, this is the very definition of an existentialist response to the 
"force of circumstance". 
Despite the veracity of much of Sartre's stoic self-image in his final 
years, however, there was also a good deal of concealment, and even 
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outright deception involved in sustaining this image. Simone de Beau-
voir recounts in her memoir of her final decade with Sartre, entitled The 
Farewell Ceremony (alternatively titled Adieux: A Farewell to Sartre), 
that Sartre would frequently lapse into depression, agitation, and even 
anger at the thought of the loss of his health and his occupation as a 
writer (de Beauvoir 1988). This picture of Sartre appears at odds with 
his statements in interviews such as those we have just now considered. 
In fact, de Beauvoir writes that Sartre would often refer to himself as 
a "living corpse" (ibid.: 74), and that when he moved to a large new 
apartment with a view of the Eiffel Tower in the mid-1970s, he referred 
to it as "this dead man's house" (ibid.: 73). Adding to Sartre's distress in 
his final days was the reaction to the release in March 1980 of excerpts 
of his taped dialogues with Benny Levy, under the title Hope Now. 
Although Sartre himself was pleased with the excerpts as they were 
published, those in Sartre's inner circle (and de Beauvoir in particular) 
were not at all impressed. In Hope Now, the views Levy attributes to 
Sartre often appear at odds with views that he held throughout his 
career. For instance, Levy has Sartre agreeing with the view that Sartre's 
conceptualization of existential despair was simply a '~fashionable'' view 
that he followed because others around him were interested in similar 
themes, especially readers of Kierkegaard (Sartre 1996: 55). Towards 
the conclusion of these excerpts, Levy attributes to Sartre a complete 
re-orientation in his philosophical perspective, guided by a newfound 
appreciation for messianic notions. At one point in the dialogue, Levy 
exclaims "you are beginning all over again at the age of seventy-five" 
(ibid.: 108). In The Farewell Ceremony, de Beauvoir was scathing of 
Levy's involvement with Sartre, accusing him of having effectively 
"abducted" the Sartre she had known and loved, and more generally of 
having harassed Sartre, forcing him to accept Levy's ideas as his own (de 
Beauvoir 1988: 119). For Levy's part, he continued to insist throughout 
his remaining years (he died in late 2003) that he never bullied Sartre 
into accepting a particular position, and that any new developments 
in Sartre's thought expressed in Hope Now were entirely his own. Just 
as Sartre had shifted from his early existentialism to concrete political 
engagement, so too, Levy argued, Sartre had shifted late in life to yet 
another way of thinking (Cohen-Sola! 1987: 519). 
However, de Beauvoir simply never accepted Levy's version of 
events. So strongly did she object to the views attributed to Sartre by 
Levy that, according to Sartre's adopted daughter Arlette Elkai'm-Sartre, 
de-Beauvoir broke down screaming and crying at Sartre in his apartment 
over his collaboration with Levy, even throwing the manuscript of the 
dialogues across the room (ibid.: 514 ). Elka:im-Sartre recalls that Sartre 
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was visibly shaken by this incident, declaring that he did not understand 
de Beauvoir; he is also said to have remarked to Elkai'.m-Sartre that de 
Beauvoir - along with other Sartreans -were treating him "like a dead 
man who has the gall to appear in public" (ibid.: 516). For the first 
time in their lives, Sartre and de Beauvoir were in an apparently severe 
rupture. So stressful was this episode for Sartre that he spoke with 
increasing urgency of his next planned vacation over Easter of 1980 to 
Belle-Ile, a French island off the coast of Brittany; presumably, Sartre 
hoped that the conflict would ultimately "blow over", so to speak. Of 
course, Sartre never made it to Belle-Ile, and the controversy he was 
engulfed in followed him to the intensive care unit at Broussais Hospi-
tal, where he would ultimately die in April 1980. He repeatedly asked 
his visitors in hospital for news of the reception of Hope Now, seeking 
positive feedback on the text in contrast to the views of de Beauvoir 
and others (ibid.: 519). 
In fairness to de Beauvoir, it is not hard to see why Sartre's collabo-
ration with Levy may have caused her such distress. By undertaking 
the taping of these dialogues with Levy, Sartre was wilfully operating 
outside of the "truth" about his life and works that he and de Beauvoir 
(along with others) had worked hard over many decades to create. If 
these divergent views now being attributed to Sartre by Levy were to 
gain widespread notoriety, or even acceptance, then the perspective 
on Sartre and his thought put forward by de Beauvoir in her memoirs, 
her biographies and so on would no doubt be placed under pressure. 
As well as the "professional" motives de Beauvoir may have had in 
seeking to protect her investment in helping to shape Sartre's image 
(as well as her own), there is the personal aspect of this conflict to be 
considered. Previously, when Sartre had sought to put forward his views 
on his life and works for posterity, he had typically involved de Beauvoir 
in one way or another. For example, in 1974, Sartre had taped a long 
series of interviews with her, excerpts from which de Beauvoir point-
edly included as an addendum to The Farewell Ceremony, as if to say 
that these interviews, and not those recorded by Levy, reflected Sartre's 
"real" voice, his true convictions and intentions. )artre's choice of Levy 
as his final interlocutor, though, effectively left de Beauvoir shut out 
of this final phase in Sartre's life. Moreover, since Sartre and de Beau-
voir had always pledged total transparency to one another regarding 
their relations with others, it must have come as a considerable shock 
to de Beauvoir to find views so utterly foreign to the enduring image 
of Sartre she had in mind attributed to him in his dialogues with Levy. 
Of course, de Beauvoir records in The Farewell Ceremony that Sartre 
expressed love and affection towards her on his deathbed in hospital, 
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and there seems no reason to doubt her version of events in this regard 
(de Beauvoir 1988: 123). Yet it is not clear that Sartre and de Beauvoir 
ever truly reconciled over their opposing views regarding Sartre's rela-
tionship with Levy; certainly, de Beauvoir never spoke to Levy again. 
In any case, the distinction at issue between Sartre's "public" image 
as presented in interviews and through other media, and the "private" 
image of him as presented through the accounts of those closest to 
him, demonstrates that Sartre's efforts (and those of his inner-circle) 
to position him in a particular light both professionally and personally, 
were never a matter of seamless consensus-building; rather, there was a 
constant tension between the "public" and "private" images of Sartre, 
and in the case of the Levy affair, these tensions were exposed and 
strained in ways that threatened the very sense of identity of all those 
involved. Sartre's legacy, then, was not merely collaboratively shaped, 
but actively contested by both Sartre himself and those closest to him. 
Indeed, Sartre's legacy is still being contested in various ways; he has 
been variously described as the moral conscience of his age, a supporter 
of murder and tyranny under Communist regimes, a womanizer, a 
fighter, a coward, and countless other things besides. For this reason, 
it is crucial that Sartre's legacy not be regarded as an evaluation of his 
life and deeds set in stone for all time, but rather as a "Jive" proposition, 
that continues to develop in new, and often unexpected directions. 
The reaction against Sartre's legacy 
The contest over Sartre's legacy, however, meant little (if anything) to 
the generation of philosophers that succeeded Sartre as the defining 
"voices" of French philosophy. Rather, the primary concern for Michel 
Foucault, Jacques Derrida,Jean-Fran~ois Lyotard and others, in relation 
to Sartre, was to demonstrate conclusively that they were not like Sartre. 
Foucault, for example, gave eloquent (if devastating) expression to 
a negative view of Sartre and his intellectual legacy, the basic conten-
tion of which was no doubt held in common with many intellectuals 
of Foucaules generation, and indeed those of subsequent generations. 
Foucault characterized the Critique of Dialectical Reason (1960b, 
1960c), the work that Sartre treasured the most of all his philosophical 
treatises, in the following terms: "The Critique of Dialectical Reason is 
the magnificent and pathetic attempt of a man of the nineteenth century 
to think the twentieth century" (Foucault 2001: 541-2). 
By attacking the Hegelian-Marxist project underpinning Sartre's 
Critique of Dialectical Reason, Foucault was not simply criticizing a 
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particular work of Sartre's, considered in isolation. Rather, Foucault 
was attacking the Critique as representative of a particular type of 
philosophical work, written by a particular type of intellectual - a type 
which Foucault wanted to confine forever to the nineteenth century. 
The "type" that Foucault had in mind was that of the "universal intel-
lectual": that is, an intellectual who critiques society and human affairs 
with recourse to transcendent or otherwise ahistorical principles, such 
as "freedom", "justice", "authenticity", and so on. For Foucault, any 
philosophical enterprise underpinned by such transcendental or other-
wise ahistorical concepts was fatally undermined by a lack of analysis 
of the localized forces (relations of power, knowledge, etc.) involved 
in constituting concepts like "freedom", "justice" and "authenticity" 
as they appear in a particular historical context. In short, Sartre rep-
resented an outmoded conception of the intellectual on Foucault's 
account, who, like a builder trying to create modern housing using 
old-fashioned tools and materials, could never hope to create a frame-
work capable of addressing the present epoch, Jet alone the intellectual's 
place within it. 
Derrida, meanwhile, mentioned Sartre only sparingly, particularly in 
his earlier writings, with "The Ends of Man" (Derrida 1969) and Glas 
(Derrida 1986, first published in 1974) serving as notable examples. 
Despite the relative scarcity of direct references to Sartre, the negativity 
of Derrida's polemic against Sartre was no less apparent. In "The Ends 
of Man", for instance, Derrida criticized Sartre's claim that nothing 
human is strange to him, because all subjectivities are expressions of 
freedom; Derrida argued that Sartre had simply substituted one pre-
supposed universal (namely "humanity") for another (namely "free 
subjectivities'') (Derrida 1969: 34-5). 
Another criticism of Sartre's methodology that is certainly evoked 
by Derrida's claim regarding the presupposition of universals, is that by 
positioning human subjectivity as central to his philosophy, Sartre had 
constructed the very object of his inquiry, by undertaking to investigate 
it; every account of the subject already constitutes its construction, 
on this view, meaning that the only productiv<r way to proceed is to 
rigorously deconstruct subjectivity, along with all other such universal 
presuppositions. In Glas, Derrida's intertwined study of Hegel and 
Genet, Derrida dismissed Sartre's phenomenology as a "misontology", 
a perspective that allowed Sartre only superficial access to Genet's writ-
ing; Derrida instead championed his deconstructionist perspective as 
allowing for a genuine immersion in Genet's texts (Derrida 1986: 28b). 
Derrida also discussed Sartre's influence on him in several interviews. 
In an extended interview in 1983 with Catherine David, for example, 
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Derrida acknowledged that Sartre had "played a major role" for him 
in his early philosophical development; however, he then immediately 
followed this acknowledgement with the assertion that he had since 
judged Sartre to have been a "nefarious and catastrophic" influence 
(Derrida 1995: 122). Pressed by David to elaborate, Derrida posed 
the following question: 
What must a society such as ours be if a man [that is Sartre], who 
in his own way, rejected or misunderstood so many theoretical 
and literary events of his time - let's say, to go quickly, psychoa-
nalysis, Marxism, structuralism, Joyce, Artaud, Bataille, Blanchot 
- who accumulated and disseminated incredible misreadings of 
Heidegger and sometimes of Husserl, could come to dominate 
the cultural scene to the point of becoming a great popular figure? 
(Ibid.) 
Derrida's contention was that Sartre, a man who had made so many 
mistakes, in his view, had attained the status of a cultura1 phenomenon 
in France - a status that could not be explained in terms of genuine 
philosophical or literary ability (notwithstanding that Derrida does 
praise Nausea, in passing, in a footnote in "Ends of Man": Derrida 
1969: 35). 
In other words, a deconstruction of Sartre's enduring cultural popu-
larity in spite of his intellectual mediocrity (from Derrida's perspective) 
was of far more interest to Derrida than Sartre's works themselves. 
These were strong words indeed from Derrida, such that David felt 
moved to ask him: "So you see in Sartre the perfect example of what 
an intellectual should not be ... ?"(Derrida 1995: 123). At this point, 
Derrida resisted going down Foucault's path of explicitly character-
izing Sartre as a negative model of all that was wrong with a certain 
generation or "type" of public intellectual; "I didn't say that", he 
replied (ibid.). 
Nevertheless, it seems dear from his earlier remarks that Derrida 
viewed Sartre as a vexing, indeed, bemusing example of popularity 
(or perhaps more accurately, notoriety) without substance, and there-
fore as a negative reflection on a tendency in French cultural life to 
embrace such superficiality. Derrida's own early investment in Sartre 
is detailed at length in Edward Earing's (2011) The Young Derrida and 
French Philosophy, and Christina Howells also argues that Derrida's 
mature work also retains some surprising proximities with dimensions 
of Sartre's thought (Howells 1991), perhaps suggesting something like 
an anxiety of influence on Derrida's behalf. 
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Whereas Foucault had dismissed Sartre as outmoded, and Derrida 
had regarded him as symptomatic of a culture of rewarding intellectual 
superficiality, Lyotard turned to irony in critiquing Sartre. In ''A Suc-
cess of Sartre's", Lyotard largely devoted himself to what he regarded 
as having been Sartre's failures (Lyotard 1986). The titular "success" 
at issue for Lyotard was Sartre's belated acknowledgement of the role 
of language in his multi-volume biography of Flaubert, The Family 
Idiot (1971-2). According to Lyotard, Sartre realized in the course of 
formulating this work, that human subjects (or "transcendences", in 
Sartre's earlier existentialist terminology) do not simply originate mean-
ing and then communicate it transparently with others. Rather, on this 
view, language has the power to constitute meanings, and to condition 
subjects in various ways (Lyotard 1986: xx). Although Sartre had by no 
means explicitly endorsed a structuralist, or indeed, post-structuralist 
perspective according to Lyotard, he had in fact arrived at a position 
closely related to these perspectives. On Lyotard's account, Sartre had 
recognized the "thickness" of words in an ontological sense, and there-
fore, their power over the subject (ibid.: xxii). In other words, Sartre's 
one real success, in Lyotard's view, was realizing that his existentialist 
perspective had been wrong. 
So then, it may seem that Sartre's only significance for subsequent 
generations of French philosophers was to act as a kind of springboard, 
as it were, propelling them in new directions. Yet, this view ignores a 
very important aspect of many post-Sartrean philosophers' intellectual 
development, alluded to by Derrida in the interview with Catherine 
David; that is, the fact that many of these philosophers who would later 
seek to consign Sartre to irrelevance had, at one time or another, been 
card-carrying Sartreans themselves. 
Another prominent example of this journey from Sartrean to Sartre-
critic, is Gilles Deleuze. In the 1964 essay ''He Was My Master", pub-
lished in the wake of Sartre's refusal of the Nobel Prize for literature, 
Deleuze declares that Sartre was his "master" up until Sartre's turn 
toward a Kantian-inspired humanism in the 1940s (Deleuze 2004: 77). 
Deleuze writes approvingly of Sartre's Being ancJ, Nothingness, particu-
larly with regard to the emphasis on conflict and violence in human 
relations that pervades this work. Deleuze also praises Sartre's earlier 
work The Transcendence of the Ego (1936-7, 1957a), asserting that 
Sartre's critique of Husserl's conception of the ego as transcendental 
yields a "pure immanence" of the transcendental field (Deleuze 2004: 
102). Deleuze began to move away from Sartre, though, when Sartre 
attempted to reconcile his existentialist perspective with a humanist 
ethics of respect for the Other's freedom, a respect which Sartre had 
221 
JEAN-PAUL SARTRE: KEY CONCEPTS 
previously denounced in Being and Nothingness, as an empty platitude. 
In sum, Deleuze regarded Sartre's earlier existentialism as tough and 
uncompromising, while regarding Sartre's humanistic existentialism as 
an insipid attempt to compromise with those who decried Sartre as an 
"immoralist". Deleuze regarded Sartre as having needlessly re-animated 
the Kantian "Kingdom of Ends", to the detriment of his renowned 
radicalism. 
Given that Deleuze was by no means alone in his trajectory in rela-
tion to Sartre, it would seem reasonable to reassess claims that Sartre's 
influence on subsequent generations was purely negative; the ways in 
which subsequent generations of philosophers have been positively 
influenced by Sartre's philosophy, ought to be taken more fully into 
account. 
Returning to Sartre 
In considering Sartre's positive influence on philosophy today, we might 
begin by acknowledging that central elements of Sartre's existential 
phenomenology in Being and Nothingness, The Transcendence of the 
Ego and elsewhere have been an important indirect influence on vari-
ous interdisciplinary fields concerned with embodied agency and the 
perception of others. That is because Sartre's early work on the emo-
tions and his chapter on the body in Being and Nothingness were a 
profound influence upon Maurice Merleau-Ponty's own philosophy 
of the body, which, for a variety of reasons, has become increasingly 
embraced in regard to debates concerning, for example, embodied and 
enactive cognition (see Varela et al. 1991), as well as J. J. Gibson's work 
on affordances (Gibson 1977); a negative evaluation of the prospects 
for projects in artificial intelligence realizing their aims and ambitions 
on an information-processing or computational model of the mind (see 
Dreyfus 1997); the extent to which our access to the minds of others 
(and to particular mental states, like anger) is predominantly inferential 
or perc~ptual in nature (Gallagher 2006; Overgaard 2012). In these 
regards (which are far from exhausting the contemporary interest) it 
is Merleau-Ponty who has been the phenomenological philosopher 
whose thought has received the most attention. But not only were 
many of Merleau-Ponty's insights developed contemporaneously with 
Sartre in relations of reciprocal influence, but Sartre also offers new 
resources for all of these debates that have not yet been as influential 
as they might soon become. While for a long time phenomenological 
work on embodied agency that affirmed the direct perception of others 
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without intermediary appeared to many Anglo-American philosophers 
as an outmoded continental reinvention of Ry lean-style behaviourism, 
the kind of anti-representational view proffered differently by Sartre 
and Merleau-Ponty is now back on the agenda in philosophical psychol-
ogy and philosophy of mind, as well as associated sciences. Indebted 
to aspects of Gestalt psychology, their phenomenological accounts of 
hodological space, embodied motility and agency, the priority of the 
pre-reflective cogito, the primacy of perception, and so on, have played 
a significant role in transforming many of the intellectualist, empiricist 
and Cartesian biases that were dominant for a long time in these fields. 
Without being able to detail all of the contributions that Sartre's phi-
losophy has already made to such fields, in what follows, the focus will 
be on the contribution that his theories of intersubjectivity are poised 
to make, given that developmental psychology and some of the cogni-
tive sciences are under some internal pressure to find and develop new 
theoretical models. 
Of course, it is true that Sartre's work on intersubjectivity is often 
the subject of premature dismissal. The hyperbolic dimension of his 
writings on the look of the Other and the pessimism of his later chapter 
on concrete relations with others, which is essentially a restatement of 
the "master-slave" stage of Hegel's struggle for recognition without the 
possibility of its sublation, are frequently treated as if they were nothing 
but the product of a certain sort of mind - a kind of adolescent paranoia 
or hysteria about the Other. To some extent this was apparent even in 
the earliest assessments of Being and Nothingness, including a review 
published by Herbert Marcuse (1948) and in Merleau-Ponty's chapter 
on other minds in Phenomenology of Perception (Merleau-Ponty [1945] 
1962). What this has meant, however, is that the significance of Sartre's 
work on intersubjectivity, both within phenomenological circles and 
more broadly in regard to philosophy of mind and social cognition, 
has tended to be downplayed. Not only has Sartre's work been impor-
tant within the phenomenological tradition, especially in highlighting 
issues with Husserl and Heidegger's treatments of intersubjectivity 
(Heidegger himself agreed with Sartre's criticisms of his treatment of 
Mitsein - see Zahavi 2001, fn 7), but even today it promises to make 
some important contributions in regard to contemporary interdisci-
plinary work on intersubjectivity. Building on the insights of Hegel, 
Husserl and Heidegger, Sartre proposes a set of necessary and sufficient 
conditions for any theory of the other, which are far from trivial. If 
correct, they would appear to be not only an obstacle dissipating solu-
tion to the epistemic problem of other minds, rather than an obstacle 
overcoming solution (see Cassam 2007: 2; Overgaard 2012), but also 
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offer some important new insights for contemporary approaches to 
issues concerning social cognition. 
In Being and Nothingness, Sartre suggests that various philosophi-
cal positions have been shipwrecked, often unawares, on the "reef of 
solipsism". His own obstacle dissipating solution to the problem of 
other minds consists, first and foremost, in his evocative descriptions 
of being subject to the look of another and the manner in which in such 
an experience we become a "transcendence transcended". On his famous 
description, we are asked to imagine that we are peeping through a key-
hole, pre-reflectively immersed and absorbed in the captivating scene 
on the other side of the door. Maybe we would be nervous engaging in 
such activities for a little, given the socio-cultural associations of being 
a '(Peeping Tom", but after a period of time we would be given over to 
the scene with self-reflection and self-awareness limited to merely the 
minimal (tacit or non-thetic) understanding that we are not what we are 
perceiving. Suddenly, though, we hear footsteps, and we have an invol-
untary apprehension of ourselves as an object in the eyes of another; a 
"pre-moral" experience of shame; a shudder of recognition that we are 
the object that the other sees, without room for any sort of inferential 
theorizing or cognizing. This ontological shift, Sartre says, has another 
person as its condition, notwithstanding whether or not one is in error 
on a particular occasion of such an experience (for example, the floor 
creaks, but there is no-one actually literally present). Our identity is 
hence experienced as transcending our own self-knowledge, or, to put 
it differently, one form of self-knowledge depends in a quasi-Hegelian 
manner on the recognition of the other. While many other phenomeno-
logical accounts emphasize empathy or direct perception of mental states 
(for example, Scheler and Merleau-Ponty), Sartre thus adds something 
significant to these accounts that seem to focus on our experience of 
the other person as an object (albeit of a special kind) rather than as a 
subject. Dan Zahavi suggests that Sartre's approach is distinctive in that: 
The other is exactly the being for whom I can appear as an object. 
Thµs, rather than focussing upon the other as a specific object of 
empathy, Sartre argues that foreign subjectivity is revealed to me 
through my awareness of myself qua being-an-object for another. 
It is when I experience my own objectivity (for and before a for-
eign subject), that I have experiential evidence for the presence 
of an other-as-subject. (Zahavi 2001: 158) 
In common with other phenomenologists like Merleau-Ponty and 
Scheler, Sartre also maintains that it is a mistake to view our relations 
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with the other as one characterized by a radical separation that we can 
bridge with inferential reasoning. Any argument by analogy, either 
to establish the existence of others in general, or particular mental 
states, is problematic, begging the question and having insufficient 
warrant (could Mother Teresa, say, argue by analogy to the mental 
states of Adolf Hitler?). Does this suggest, then, that Sartre must 
be a quite radical sceptic about our relations with others? Can we 
merely deduce the structure of being-for-other from the first-personal 
experience of shame with little else to go on in our interactions with 
others? Does Sartre's philosophy leave us haunted by the unknow-
able other, leaving us with a kind of agnosticism about the other, 
as Merleau-Ponty says in The Visible and the Invisible (Merleau-
Ponty (1964] 1968: 79), reprising themes from Phenomenology of 
Perception. 
This, however, is not an entirely fair reading of Sartre's philoso-
phy. Notwithstanding the sense in which for Sartre we are perennially 
"transcended" by the other who eludes our cognitive grasp in important 
respects, Sartre is actually not a sceptic about our knowledge of other's 
mental states tout court. We can, in fact, viscerally perceive bad faith, 
on his account. It is nothing other than its expression. This should 
not surprise us unduly, given that Sartre maintains that the body is a 
synthetic totality of life and action (BN1: 346; BN2: 370). While bad 
faith is admittedly a complex form of behaviour, there are other simpler 
situations in which direct embodied perception is also argued by him 
to be sufficient for understanding the emotions of others. Indeed, he 
adds a comment of clear resonance to Merleau-Ponty's own work and 
that of other phenomenologists who emphasize bodily expressivity and 
direct perception of others: 
Of course there is a psychic cryptography; certain phenomena 
are "hidden". But this certainly does not mean that the meanings 
refer to something "beyond the body" ... These frowns, this red-
ness, this stammering, this slight trembling of the hands, these 
downcast looks which seem at once timid anc}threatening - these 
do not express anger; they are the anger. But this point must be 
clearly understood. In itself a clenched fist is nothing and means 
nothing. But we also never perceive a clenched fist. We perceive 
a man who in a certain situation clenches his fist. This meaningful 
act considered in connection with the past and with possibles and 
understood in terms of the synthetic totality "body in situation" is 
the anger. It refers to nothing other than to actions in the world 
(to strike, to insult, etc.). (BNl: 346; BN2: 370) 
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Basically, Sartre maintains there is direct perceptual access to others 
in emotions like anger, albeit of a different nature to our access to our 
own anger. Inferential models of our knowledge of others obscure this 
apparent descriptive fact (it seems that we don't infer, theorize, simu-
late, etc., when we see the raised and tense fist of an opposing supporter 
at a football game) and they also make various epistemic assumptions if 
they purport to show what a justification for our knowledge of others 
ought to consist in. After all, they tend to assume without argument 
that all mental states are necessarily hidden and inaccessible, and thus 
buy into a Cartesian perspective that both Sartre and Merleau-Ponty 
differently challenge. Moreover, any such inferential and theoretical 
considerations can only give us the other as a probability or a hypoth-
esis as Sartre suggests, and thus seem peculiarly unable to deal with 
the apparent epistemic certainty we have in witnessing a given form 
of anger in context. 
Now, it might be thought that any such direct perception view fits 
uneasily with other aspects of Sartre's work. After all, it is Sartre for 
whom the perspective of the other eludes and frustrates us in our con-
crete relations with them, whether that be in regard to love, desire, or 
anything else. But perhaps there is no incompatibility here. For Sartre, 
our relations with other people are not conflictual because we are stuck 
with hypothesizing about others, inferring what it is they are up to in 
an intellectualist's horror scenario that appears closely related to the 
actual experience of autism. While the other is given to us directly in 
their embodiment, for Sartre, their constitutive freedom also means 
that when we seize on this, or attempt to pin it down as a basis for our 
own self-knowledge, it is inevitably the other as they were rather than 
currently are that we grasp. We may even frame some of Sartre's insights 
in this respect in a more positive way; there is dynamic interaction, a 
structural coupling, in which self and other solicit each other in a free 
and unfolding expression that cannot be anticipated or predicted. What 
we are, and what the other is, is not what we (or they) will be. As he 
puts it, "The body-for-others is the magic object par excellence. Thus 
the Oth,er's body is always a 'body more than body' because the Other is 
given to me totally and without intermediary in the perpetual surpassing 
of its facticity" (BNl: 351; BN2: 3 74 ). Whether this sort of position 
about the body-for-others should attract the sort of negative valence 
that Sartre gives it, admittedly quite often, is a question worth asking, 
but it is arguable that Sartre's necessary and sufficient conditions for a 
theory of intersubjectivity do not directly entail such a view (indeed, 
his abandoned Notebooks for an Ethics were one notable attempt to 
show this; Sartre 1983b, 1992). 
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While phenomenology alone may not be sufficient for a theory of 
inter-subjectivity as Sartre seemed to maintain, since other resources of 
a more empirical nature demand to be considered (for example, findings 
of developmental psychology, cognitive science, etc.), one of the reasons 
why Sartre's view promises to help contribute to contemporary debates 
is precisely because his work strongly challenges many of the basic pre-
suppositions of the philosophical and psychological literature regarding 
social understanding that has dominated since the 1980s. Without sum-
marizing the various psychological results concerning false-belief tests 
here, it suffices to say that the two dominant approaches in this field 
and within analytic philosophy - theory theory and simulation theory 
- remain mentalistic approaches to social cognition that emphasize the 
importance of mind-reading, as opposed to what we might call body-
reading, notwithstanding the behaviourist connotations of such a term. 
Shaun Gallagher suggests that theory theory and simulation theory, and 
hybrid versions of them, have four basic assumptions: 
1. Hidden minds 
... Since we cannot directly perceive the other's beliefs, desires, 
feelings, or intentions, we need some extra-perceptual cognitive 
process (inference or simulation) to understand their mental states. 
2. Mindreading as default 
These mindreading processes constitute our primary, pervasive, 
or default way of understanding others. 
3. Observational stance 
Our normal everyday stance towards the other person is a third 
personal, observational stance. We observe their behaviours in 
order to explain and predict their actions. 
4. Methodological individualism 
Our understanding of others depends primarily on cognitive capa-
bilities or mechanisms located in an individual subject. 
(Gallagher 2012: 194) 
As would be apparent, Sartre's necessary and sl}fficient criteria for an 
adequate theory of intersubjectivity contest all of these views. Moreo-
ver, pressure has also come on these commitments from within the 
relevant sciences themselves, perhaps especially in developmental psy-
chology, given the capacity of early neonates to interact and understand 
intentions, emotions and so on prior to the acquisition of language and 
the passing of the false-belief test at the age of four or five. 
Nonetheless, the standard approach has been to create hybrid ver-
sions of these two dominant perspectives, thus remaining largely guided 
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by the above four basic assumptions. Much more needs to be said about 
this, but we hope to have done enough in this short discussion to sug-
gest that there are important resources within the phenomenological 
tradition, and in Sartre's work in particular, for motivating more radical 
revisions within contemporary work on social cognition, helping to 
induce something like a paradigm shift in which the theoretical con-
tributions of existential phenomenology has an important role to play. 
Of course, the jury is still out in regard to just how fertile such a theo-
retical pairing might be. It would depend on the dialectical relationship 
between the given philosophical theory and what is revealed by new 
empirical investigations that have been shorn of some (arguably) faulty 
assumptions with which they have laboured. Yet there is at least some 
evidence that, in regard to embodiment and intersubjectivity, Sartre's 
early work may well be proved to have been right at the wrong time 
(which is what Sartre said of Cornelius Castoriadis on certain political 
questions). Perhaps now, however, it is also the right time for a return 
to Sartre on these and other issues. 
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